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ABSTRACT 
FAIRNESS & SOCIAL JUSTICE: DISTINCT MORALITIES 
FEBRUARY 2016 
PRERANA BHARADWAJ,  
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
M.S., HUNTER COLLEGE 
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Ronnie Janoff-Bulman 
 
Individual deservingness and group-based equality as rules of distribution have routinely 
been conflated in past research. These two studies are an attempt to further establish the 
differences between these two as moral values named fairness and social justice, 
respectively. In both studies, participants rated “moral acceptability” of eight real-world 
scenarios that either upheld fairness and violated social justice or vice versa. Each of 
these scenarios was presented at two time points: at time 1, the upheld principle was 
presented and the violation of the other was implied, but at time 2, the violation was 
made apparent with a second sentence. Individual preferences for fairness and social 
justice were also measured. Study 1 primed basic principles of each value with a sentence 
scramble task before participants responded to the scenarios. Priming social justice 
principles significantly decreased moral acceptability ratings of fair scenarios before the 
social injustice was made apparent compared to the control condition, but ultimately 
individual differences in preferences for each principle were most predictive of moral 
acceptability ratings of both types of scenarios. Study 2 primed individual and collective 
perspectives with a writing prompt before participants responded to scenarios. Both 
priming tasks increased moral acceptability ratings of socially just scenarios before the 
unfairness was made apparent. This may have been due to the nature of the writing 
prompts, both of which required the participant to think of others, suggesting that social 
justice involves the consideration of social categories rather than simply a collection of 
people. In both studies, priming tasks and individual differences were generally unable to 
encourage recognition of the violation one or the other value, prompting the discussion of 
what else might promote such effortful thinking. 
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CHAPTER 1 
FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE - THE CONFLICT 
A. Introduction 
In a recent The New York Times op ed, Rob Reich presents an argument against 
parents donating large amounts of money to their child’s public school (Reich, 2013). 
Reich discusses the case of Hillsborough, California, a wealthy town that encourages 
donations to public schools of about $2,300 per student. At first glance, few readers can 
find anything morally unacceptable about parents wanting to support their own child’s 
education. However, Reich (2013) writes: “Private giving to public schools widens the 
gap between rich and poor. It exacerbates inequalities in financing. It is philanthropy in 
the service of conferring advantage on the already well off” (p. A25). Essentially, Reich 
claims that allowing public school donations would improve some schools, but not others 
– and this increased inequality is unacceptable. We believe that the conflict between these 
two opinions of the same situation stems from two different but nevertheless valid moral 
values: fairness and social justice.  
Fundamentally, the debate concerns moral rules for allocation of resources in a 
society. The method we propose as fairness uses input-based deservingness to allocate 
resources. However, resources allotted according to individual merit can result in an 
unfair distribution of such resources on the group level. Such a distribution would violate 
values of social justice, which allots resources on the basis of group membership. For 
instance, allocating funding to schools based on the individual incomes of students’ 
families would result in an unequal distribution of funding across schools situated in 
high- and low-income communities. Allocating funding in accordance with social justice 
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would pool money sources (e.g., property taxes, donations, etc.) across a city or state and 
would divide the proceeds relatively equally across schools.   
The proposed research aims to understand the psychological frameworks that 
guide cognition and judgments of fairness and social justice principles. Distinguishing 
between the two terms will allow us to understand their underlying features and provide 
support for including social justice as a moral value separate from, but comparable to, 
fairness in the moral psychology literature.  
B. Fairness and Social Justice in Theory 
 The debate concerning differing rules of allocation of resources and what 
constitutes a “just” society is not a new one, nor is it confined to psychology. In the early 
1970s, John Rawls and Robert Nozick famously argued for different rules. Rawls (1971) 
suggested a thought experiment in his now-classic book, A Theory of Justice. To develop 
a just society, we should be under what he called a “veil of ignorance” in which we had 
no prior knowledge of our abilities, education, wealth, or ethnicity. What kind of society 
would we create then? He believed rational agents would create a society in which 
everyone was guaranteed basic rights, including equality of opportunity. Furthermore, 
equality of opportunity requires access to similar resources, so the society would also 
have to be somewhat redistributive (in the direction of providing more resources to the 
least advantaged), thereby ensuring a decent standard of living for everyone (Rawls, 
1971).  
In 1974, Nozick wrote Anarchy, State, and Utopia, in which he disagreed with 
Rawls and presented an alternative view. Nozick argued that a truly just society is one 
that results from a completely unfettered free market. If one person produces a good or 
service that is in high demand and others voluntarily pay for it, this person has a right to 
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the money he earns. He gives the example of Wilt Chamberlain, the basketball player, 
who earns money from the tickets for which his fans freely pay, which he has no 
obligation to return in the form of taxes (Nozick, 1974).  
For the most part, both sides of this debate seem to make comparable sense. How 
is this possible? We propose that fairness and social justice represent two different but 
nevertheless valid moral values that we can hold simultaneously. Conflict results when 
the two values cannot coexist as rules for the allocation of resources in the same situation.   
So how do fairness and social justice differ?  We propose that the principles 
involve two different ways of thinking about deservingness.  More specifically, Fairness 
involves input-based deservingness and results in outcomes based on proportionality.  In 
contrast, Social Justice involves deservingness based on common group membership and 
results in outcomes that are relatively equal across the group.  Fairness is based on an 
individual or group’s specific effort, work, or contributions, whereas Social Justice is 
based in communal sharing of the group’s resources - here a person is entitled to 
distributions as a member of the group. Cognitively, Fairness requires the restricted, 
vertical comparison of units that are seen as different within specific relationships, 
whereas Social Justice requires the broader, horizontal comparison of similar groups 
across a distribution.   
Past work has been largely theoretical wherein political philosophers and 
economists have argued over the distribution rules that are most effective in making 
various decisions (also known as distributive justice). One prevalent model of distributive 
justice is Equity Theory, which is motivated by a need to balance individual inputs and 
the resulting outcomes (see, e.g., Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997).  We believe 
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that Fairness relies on equity judgments, in that both are based in principles of 
proportionality. Yet proportionality in distributing goods and services could conceivably 
confer inappropriate advantage to members of groups with more resources in a formal 
system, thus resulting in a skewed distribution of the resources on a larger scale. A 
different principle, based in shared group membership-level concerns, would demand 
redistribution to result in the relatively equal distribution of resources across such groups; 
this reflects the principle of social justice.  
Distinguishing between two rules of distributional justice, individual 
deservingness and group-based equality, has been explored in the past more theoretically 
than empirically. Sampson (1975) puts forth the concept of “justice as equality” and 
suggests that “equality” and “equity” often conflict in the real world, but individual and 
contextual differences may predict which is valued in any given situation. Cohen (1979) 
expands on this distinction but makes a clear argument for the necessity of empirical 
research as there are a number of confusing conceptual frameworks and terms that 
encompass what he refers to as rules of distribution that either do or do not differentiate 
between individuals by some level of input. Wenzel (2004) picks up this thread but 
emphasizes the role of group membership in his chapter dedicated to a “social 
categorization approach to distributive justice” wherein two empirical studies suggest that 
identifying with a subgroup predicts greater preference for equality over self-interest. 
The current research extends these earlier findings and theoretical arguments in 
three ways. First, previous research has largely focused on the behavior of dyads (Cohen, 
1979), while the current research uses real-world phenomena presented as scenarios 
involving individuals and groups of people. Second, while individual deservingness and 
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group-based equality may be useful academic distinctions, fairness and social justice are 
supported here as concise terms that capture the descriptive and normative ways in which 
people already think about these two principles – a valuable characteristic for social 
psychologists. Third, the current research takes a step forward by attempting to 
understand the relationships between the two principles within the individual.  
The past work closest to our perspective on fairness versus social justice is a 1981 
paper by Brickman and colleagues (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981), in which 
they distinguish between microjustice and macrojustice. Microjustice requires and 
involves individual recipients, whereas macrojustice involves the aggregate distribution 
of rewards in society. This theoretical chapter explains that in various situations, treating 
individuals in accordance with microjustice may produce what seems to be an unjust 
distribution of rewards among groups. Moreover, Brickman and colleagues present 
evidence demonstrating that although people may initially use microjustice to make 
decisions, they are unhappy when this rule results in negatively skewed distributions 
across groups (Brickman, et.al., 1981).  From our perspective, fairness is akin to 
Brickman et al’s (1981) microjustice, and social justice is akin to macrojustice. Equity 
theory and microjustice, and equality and macrojustice, typically involve the behavior 
and identity of individuals vs. groups, respectively, but there are situations where groups 
exhibit input-based deservingness and the individual is a victim of inequality as a result 
of group membership. Thus, fairness and social justice better and more completely 
capture the difference between these two distribution rules.  
C. Fairness & Social Justice in Moral Psychology 
Current understanding of moral principles relies on the prevailing model of moral 
values -- Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; e.g., Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & 
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Ditto, 2011; Haidt, 2007, 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007).  According to Haidt and 
colleagues, there are five moral foundations:  two “individualizing” foundations 
(Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity) and three “binding” foundations (Ingroup/Loyalty, 
Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity).  The individualizing foundations emphasize the 
individual as the focus of concern and involve contractual approaches to morality. In 
contrast, the binding foundations emphasize the group as the focus of concern and 
function to bind people together.   
Although present in MFT, Fairness is ill-defined and the foundation seems to 
confound different definitions.   A brief look at the six MFT items for Fairness makes this 
apparent.  The six items are:  “Whether or not some people were treated differently than 
others” (item 2); “Whether or not someone acted unfairly” (item 8); “Whether or not 
someone was denied his or her rights” (item 13); “When the government makes laws, the 
number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly” (item 18);  
“Justice is the most important requirement for a society” (item 24), and “I think it’s 
morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit 
nothing” (item 29).  On 6-point scales, participants indicate the relevance of items 2, 8, 
and 13 to their own thinking and the extent of their agreement with items 18, 24, and 29.   
Participants are left to define fairness for themselves - the word justice is even used in 
place of fairness in one of the items.    
Interestingly, in linking morality to political ideology, Haidt and colleagues 
(Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2007, 2012; Haidt & 
Graham, 2007) conclude that liberals emphasize the individualizing foundations, whereas 
conservatives rely on all five foundations, both the individualizing and binding 
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foundations. The provocative implication of their claims is that liberals don’t have a 
morality that is focused on the group; that is, only conservatives have a group-based 
morality. Moreover, in his recent book, Haidt (2012) returns to the Fairness foundation 
and writes, “Everyone cares about fairness, but there are two major kinds. On the 
[political] left, fairness often implies equality, but on the [political] right it means 
proportionality—people should be rewarded in proportion to what they contribute, even if 
that guarantees unequal outcomes” (p. 138).  
We will argue otherwise: everyone does value Fairness, but fairness has a 
particular and similar meaning across the political spectrum (largely a concept focused on 
individual input and proportionality).  However, the equality of the political left Haidt 
refers to actually reflects concerns about Social Justice, a group-based morality missing 
from the MFT.  
A new model of morality addresses this omission and Haidt and colleagues’ claim 
that there is no liberal group-based morality (i.e., the three binding moralities in MFT are 
endorsed by conservatives and not liberals). More specifically, in their Model of Moral 
Motives (MMM) Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) derived distinct moral principles by 
turning to a fundamental motivational distinction, approach versus avoidance, and 
crossing these orientations with three foci of moral concern: the self (intrapersonal), the 
other (interpersonal), and the group (collective). Approach-based morality, or prescriptive 
morality, emphasizes positive, selfless behaviors, whereas avoidance-based morality, or 
proscriptive morality, is restrictive and involves restraining negative, self-interested 
behaviors (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009).  A key extension of moral principles 
in the MMM involves the group-focused, or binding, moralities.  MMM includes both an 
 8 
 
approach-based and an avoidance-based binding morality, specifically Social Justice and 
Social Order, respectively. 
Social Order emphasizes conformity and strict adherence to behavioral norms.  It 
is responsive to threats and dangers to the group, be they threats to physical safety or 
psychological identity.  Social Order serves collective coordination; self-interest and self-
expression are constrained in the service of the larger group’s interests.  
In contrast, Social Justice involves efforts to advance the group’s welfare, with a 
particular emphasis on equality-based distributional outcomes.  It promotes collective 
cooperation rather than coordination.  A Social Justice morality is oriented towards 
providing for the group, whereas a Social Order morality is oriented towards protecting 
the group (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; also see Janoff-Bulman, 2009).        
   Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) claim that the three binding moralities of 
MFT are all mechanisms that serve Social Order, and empirical research supports this 
claim (see, e.g., Carnes, Lickel, and Janoff-Bulman, 2014).  MFT includes only 
proscriptive group moralities and omits a prescriptive morality, and thus it is small 
wonder that based on the MFT moral foundations, only political conservatives endorse a 
binding morality.  When including Social Justice, however, both political liberals and 
conservatives have a binding morality (see, e.g., Carnes et al., 2014; Janoff-Bulman & 
Carnes, 2014). The proposed studies will further buttress Social Justice as a distinct and 
important moral value.  
D. Past Empirical Work on Fairness and Social Justice.  
Brickman et al. (1981) have inspired a number of studies attempting to understand 
individual preference for micro or macrojustice and its effect on attitudes and decisions. 
These studies each reinforce general qualities we are categorizing as fairness or social 
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justice. Murphy-Berman and colleagues (Murphy-Berman, Cukur & Berman, 2002) 
asked Turkish and US respondents to allocate resources to individuals and groups in two 
conditions: microjustice and macrojustice situations. Subjects used microjustice rules to 
allocate resources to individuals but macrojustice rules to allocate resources to groups (. 
Another study, using a mood induction, found that elated participants were more likely to 
use macrojustice rules, whereas depressed participants were more likely to use 
microjustice rules (Sinclair & Mark, 1991). In 2007, researchers took the question to real-
world phenomena. Lillie and colleagues found that participants in the microjustice 
condition perceived the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as less 
acceptable than those in the macrojustice condition (Lillie & Janoff-Bulman, 2007). A 
1998 study found that, overall, macrojustice arguments were more successful for pro-
environmentalist decisions while microjustice arguments were more successful for anti-
environmentalist decisions (Clayton, 1998).  
Although the microjustice-macrojustice model and subsequent studies speak to 
some important differences, the model is incomplete and the defining features of past 
work on macrojustice and microjustice seem to be whether they refer to an individual’s 
outcome or a group’s outcome.  Another study by Jost and colleagues provides evidence 
suggesting that intergroup allocation decisions can reflect both proportionality and 
equality between groups (Jost & Azzi, 1996). This provides motivation to consider 
fairness and social justice at both the individual and group levels.   After all, societal 
groups can be considered both collections of individuals and subsets of larger society, 
and a single person can be a unique individual or a group member.  
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Several studies have also used different measures of self construals to grasp how 
people are thinking about individual deservingness and group membership-based 
equality. In an exploratory 2007 study on self-construal styles, results showed that 
manipulating an interdependent self-construal induced stronger reactions to injustice and 
moral concerns (Gollwitzer, M., & Bucklein, K., 2007).   
However, like most studies eliciting reactions to “injustice” or “moral concerns,” 
the scenarios in this study confounded violations of input-based deservingness with 
violations of group membership-based equality. Connecting self-construal and 
micro/macrojustice, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011) assessed participants’ independent self-
construals and found that high scores were associated with lower endorsement of 
macrojustice and lower support for Affirmative Action. We interpret Affirmative Action 
as a prime example of when the values of fairness and social justice come into conflict. 
On the one hand, colleges aim to recruit students who display exceptional academic 
merit. However, admissions policies also take into account other considerations such as 
past hardship, extraneous circumstances, and, most importantly, group membership. 
Making admissions decisions on individual deservingness and merit alone would result in 
a negatively skewed distribution of admissions concentrated in groups with access to 
more resources. Thus interpreted from our perspective, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011) 
found that people who defined themselves in terms of their independence from others 
were less likely to use what we would consider a social justice lens and instead relied on 
a fairness lens when considering Affirmative Action.   
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CHAPTER 2 
MY PRIOR PRELIMINARY RESEARCH  
While we may have imposed the words fairness and social justice onto two sets of 
principles, there are parallels in everyday language. In a previous exploratory study, we 
asked 70 college students to give us examples of fairness and unfairness or social justice 
and social injustice. Each of their open-ended responses was coded by independent 
coders for key words that described individuals/groups, ascribed membership/actions, 
and discrete examples/global phenomena, among others. When asked about fairness and 
unfairness, participants used more words involving a collection of unrelated people, 
reciprocity, proportionality, and discrete events, but when asked about social justice and 
social injustice, they used more words about people in social categories, instances of 
discrimination or prejudice, ongoing phenomena, and group membership. Therefore, 
although the terms were imposed on two sets of qualities, we concluded that they are in 
fact comparable to the connotations of fairness and social justice in everyday language.   
A second exploratory study aimed to demonstrate that participants can hold 
equally valid opinions of fairness and social justice at the same time. Previous work has 
attempted to use individual differences in sensitivity to social justice to predict decisions. 
Specifically, endorsement of social justice tends to be associated with liberalism and 
identification with the Democratic Party (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008). 
Fairness, however, may be a universal value that is the default method of evaluation. For 
this study, 202 participants recruited online were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions, and each took three surveys. In the first condition, participants took a measure 
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of fairness, a filler measure (BIS/BAS), and a measure of social justice. In the second 
condition, the order was reversed.  
The five-item Fairness Scale was adapted from the Preference for the Merit 
Principle Scale (Davey, L., Bobocel, DR., Hing, L., Zanna, M., 1999). Five items that 
specifically endorsed rules for rewarding individual contribution were chosen from the 
PMP to create the Fairness Scale. The statements were rewritten to reflect groups in 
society and vague rewards, rather than the original words that specified pay in a 
workplace environment. Examples of statements in the Fairness Scale include: “In 
society, people who do a good job ought to rise to the top” and “The effort a person puts 
into something ought to be reflected in the size of the reward he or she receives” [see 
Appendix C for full scale]. Participants also completed the five-item Social Justice scale 
from the Model of Moral Motives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013, 2014).  Examples of 
statements in the Social Justice Scale include “In the healthiest societies, those at the top 
should feel responsible for improving the wellbeing of those at the bottom” and “It is our 
responsibility, not just a matter of personal preference, to provide for groups worse off in 
society” [see Appendix D for full scale]. A filler task was included between the measures 
of Fairness and Social Justice: participants completed 14 items from the Carver and 
White’s (1994) Behavioral Inhibition/Activation Scale. 
We found no order effects; that is, Fairness did not differ based on whether it was 
administered first or last; nor did Social Justice differ based on order. As predicted, 
Fairness and Social Justice represented unique principles, for across both time points, 
Fairness and Social Justice scores were uncorrelated.  The extent to which participants 
endorsed one was unrelated to their endorsement of the other.  Also, Fairness was not 
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associated with political orientation, but Social Justice was negatively correlated with 
Political Orientation; that is, conservatism was associated with lower Social Justice 
scores. Thus, support of Social Justice principles appears to be politically aligned, but 
Fairness principles may have more universal appeal, as they are unrelated to political 
positions. Essentially, each scale, Fairness and Social Justice, seems to tap independent 
distributional principles, which are not mutually exclusive.    
Finally, construal level was explored in a third study where an abstract or concrete 
construal level was first primed, and then endorsement of either Fairness or Social Justice 
values was measured. Because we believe Fairness involves a restricted perspective of 
specific units of exchange, we predicted that this would be connected to a concrete 
cognitive framework focused on details, rather than the big picture. Conversely, because 
Social Justice involves an inclusive, horizontal comparison across groups, we predicted 
that this broader perspective would be connected to an abstract cognitive framework. The 
study asked 322 online respondents to complete a Construal Level priming task drawn 
from Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi (2006). In this task, the instructions to the 
participant determine whether the task primed a concrete construal or an abstract 
construal level. The “abstract” directions are to list the larger categories that define each 
of 20 distinct items. The “concrete” directions are to list specific examples of the same 20 
items. The control condition did not involve any priming task. Participants also either 
completed the Fairness scale or Social Justice scale utilized earlier. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of six conditions crossing abstract, concrete, and no-prime 
construals with completion of the Fairness and Social Justice scales. Responses on the 
Fairness scale were unchanged by condition (i.e.., abstract, concrete, and no-prime 
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control), but there was a significant difference in Social Justice scores by prime  The 
concrete and control conditions did not differ, but both differed significantly from the 
abstract prime condition.  Inducing an abstract state of mind resulted in higher 
endorsement of Social Justice, compared with both concrete and no prime conditions, 
suggesting that Social Justice involves a style of processing that promotes thinking about 
the “big picture.”    
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY PURPOSE & MATERIALS 
A. Purpose 
Our earlier studies were largely exploratory and served as a first step to 
establishing what we refer to as fairness and social justice as two distinct moral methods 
of allocating resources, which can often come into conflict with each other. However, no 
other studies thus far have explored the use of a fairness or social justice lens in 
evaluating real-world situations in a variety of domains that can be seen from both 
angles. In addition, although some studies have attempted to influence sensitivity to 
moral values by manipulating perspective, stimuli have largely confounded individual 
deservingness and equality based on group membership. Lastly, while some aspects of 
both reciprocity and equality may be partially represented in the morality literature as 
“fairness” in the Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2007), these concepts are confounded 
and social justice as a moral value is conspicuously missing.  
Moving forward, the following two studies aimed to understand how different 
psychological frameworks can affect moral judgments of fairness and social justice. We 
were particularly interested in how people make moral judgments when the two 
principles are in conflict.  The first study explored whether priming each principle affects 
moral judgments. We hypothesized that priming a fairness lens would increase sensitivity 
to input-based deservingness that isn’t specifically mentioned in the scenarios, whereas 
priming a social justice lens would increase sensitivity to group membership-based 
allocations of resources and the resulting equal or skewed distributions. The second study 
explored whether focusing either on the individual (via a person’s unique identity) or the 
group (via common group identity) affects moral judgments of the same situations used 
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in Study 1. We hypothesized that focusing on a unique individual identity would increase 
sensitivity to input-based deservingness that isn’t specifically mentioned in the scenarios, 
whereas focusing on a collective social identity would increase sensitivity to group 
membership-based allocations of resources and the resulting equal or skewed 
distributions. Both of the studies were designed to shed light on how different mental 
models can affect sensitivity to, and endorsement of, fairness and social justice 
principles. These studies aimed to provide support for including social justice as a moral 
value that is comparable to, but distinct from, fairness in the moral psychology literature 
and to better understand when we rely on each principle in instances when they conflict. 
B. Materials: Scenarios 
Both studies used moral acceptability ratings (from 1 to 7, 1 = “not at all 
acceptable” and 7 = “very acceptable”) of hypothetical scenarios as the dependent 
variable. Each of the 16 scenarios pitted fairness and social justice values against each 
other such that they showcased instances where input-based deservingness rules create a 
skewed distribution across groups (8 scenarios), or instances where rules that support 
group membership-based equality violate individual deservingness (8 scenarios). All of 
the scenarios were inspired by Rob Reich’s example of the drawbacks of a seemingly 
moral act (parents donating to their child’s public school). Each of the scenarios was 
composed of two parts, hereby referred to as Time 1 and Time 2. At Time 1, participants 
only read enough information to identify the situation, which on its face is either fair (8 
scenarios) or socially just (8 scenarios). At this point, participants may or may not 
recognize the moral value being violated (fairness or social justice). At Time 2, additional 
information is presented that explicitly violates the moral principle presented at Time 1, 
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but supports the other principle. Here, the conflict between the two moral values is 
evident.  Moral acceptability of the scenarios is rated at both Time 1 and Time 2.   
An example of a “Fair but Unjust” scenario at Time 1 was: 
 “In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal  
of money to their children’s public school.” 
 
An example of a “Fair but Unjust” scenario at Time 2 was: 
 “In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal  
 of money to their children’s public school.  
 Other public schools in the city with lower income families  
get no additional funds from parents.” 
 
An example of a “Just but Unfair” scenario at Time 1 was: 
“Students at a major university are admitted based on a  
combination of factors, including academic achievement,  
past hardship, and group membership.” 
 
An example of a “Just but Unfair” scenario at Time 2 was: 
 Students at a major university are admitted based on a  
combination of factors, including academic achievement,  
past hardship, and group membership.  
Some students with better academic records are not admitted to the university.” 
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[See Appendix A for a list of all scenarios] 
 There were therefore eight Time 1 scenarios that were Fair but Unjust 
(Cronbach’s α = .695) and eight Time 2 scenarios that provided the additional justice 
violation for the Fair but Unjust scenarios (α = .898).  Similarly, there were eight Just but 
Unfair scenarios at Time 1 (α = .903), and eight at Time 2 when the additional fairness 
violation was added to these scenarios (α = .906).   
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 1 
A. Methods of Study 1 
 The purpose of the first study was to determine whether priming principles of 
fairness and social justice can be used to influence moral judgments of scenarios in which 
fairness and social justice are in conflict.  We were particularly interested in whether 
participants primed with a particular principle (e.g., social justice) would recognize 
violations of that principle when it was not mentioned in the scenario (e.g., recognizing 
that donating to your child’s public school violates social justice principles) or would be 
less likely to recognize it when primed with a consistent principle (i.e., fairness).  
i. Materials 
The independent variable was operationalized as a priming task that instructed 
participants to unscramble (i.e., place in order) several words within six sentences that 
either endorsed fairness or social justice values (four sentences), or were filler items (two 
sentences). For example, participants may have seen the following sentence where the 
words “the economic equality” are scrambled: 
“The healthier the society, the greater [equality economic the].” 
[See Appendix B for all items] 
Control conditions completed no scrambling task. The dependent variable was 
operationalized as a mean moral acceptability rating (from 1 to 7, 1 = “not at all 
acceptable” and 7 = “very acceptable”) at Time 1 and Time 2 of each of the eight 
developed scenarios.  
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ii. Hypotheses 
Condition as indicated by the priming task was a between-subjects variable and 
time was a within-subjects variable.  Therefore, we first hypothesized a main effect of 
time such that mean moral acceptability ratings of scenarios across conditions would 
decrease from Time 1 when the conflict was presented at Time 2. 
Second, we hypothesized an interaction of condition by time within type of 
scenario. Essentially, we predicted that participants primed with Social Justice would rate 
scenarios where fairness was upheld but social justice was violated (Fair but Unjust) as 
less acceptable as compared to individuals primed with Fairness or in the control 
condition for those scenarios. Similarly, we predicted that participants primed with 
Fairness would rate scenarios where social justice was upheld but fairness was violated 
(Just but Unfair) as less acceptable compared to individuals primed with Social Justice or 
in the control condition for those scenarios. However, the interaction with time was 
predicted such that the difference in mean moral acceptability ratings within scenario 
type between conditions would be significant at Time 1 before the conflict was made 
apparent, but ratings at Time 2 would not differ between conditions; rather they would be 
equally low across conditions.  
Furthermore, in addition to these main analyses, moderation by individual 
differences in endorsement of Fairness and Social Justice was explored. Participants’ 
Fairness and Social Justice scores from the scales they completed at the end of the 
procedure may serve as possible explanations for why certain subjects may already have 
been sensitive to each value above and beyond the prime. Specifically, we hypothesized a 
scale by time interaction (hypothesis 3) such that participants high on Fairness would 
react negatively to Socially Just but Unfair scenarios, presumably initially recognizing 
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the unfairness as they are sensitive to it, and rate them as less acceptable at Time 1, but at 
Time 2 they would rate them as low as people low on Fairness. Similarly, we predicted 
that participants high on Social Justice would react negatively to Fair but Socially Unjust 
scenarios, presumably recognizing the injustice, and rate them as less acceptable at Time 
1 compared to people low on Social Justice. Moreover, we hypothesized a scale by time 
by condition three-way interaction (hypothesis 4) such that where scales and conditions 
are consonant (e.g. Fairness prime and high endorsement of Fairness or Social Justice 
prime and high endorsement of Social Justice) mean moral acceptability ratings of 
scenarios that uphold the same consonant value would be increased at Time 1, as the 
prime may particularly activate sensitivity to the consonant principle.  
iii. Participants 
Participants were recruited online from a diverse and inclusive population. A total 
of 357 participants were assigned to one of six conditions. Although 455 participants 
originally completed the study, participants were excluded if they refused to give consent 
or did not complete the priming task, incorrectly answered the attention check question 
(marked a different option for a question instructing participants to mark “Option 4”), 
took 1 standard deviation less than the mean time to complete the study, or took two 
standard deviations more than the mean time to complete the study. There were also three 
outliers on the political identity scale who indicated a conservative political identity but 
also a contradictory strong belief in social justice; a closer look showed that these 
respondents had entered the same number as a response for all questions and were thus 
removed from the sample for not completing the study conscientiously. Informed consent 
was obtained for all of the included participants and they received monetary 
compensation for their participation.  
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Participants ranged from age 19 to age 70 (M = 37.53, SD = 11.60). Fifty-two 
percent of the participants were female, and 48% were male. The sample was 79% White, 
7% Black, 4% Hispanic, 5% Asian, and 5% reported “Other.”  
iv. Procedure   
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of six conditions (3 x 2) where 
priming task (fairness, social justice, and control) was crossed with which value was 
upheld in the Time 1 scenarios (fairness but not social justice, or social justice but not 
fairness). Participants were not given a mixed set of all 16 scenarios due to contamination 
of concepts – participants would be sensitive to both values upheld equally in the 
combined set of scenarios. Each participant first completed one of the three priming 
tasks. Then, participants read all 8 assigned scenarios and rated their “‘moral 
acceptability” based on the Time 1 information given. They were then given the same 
scenarios with both parts included (Time 2) and again rated their “moral acceptability.” 
Participants also completed the 5-item Fairness Scale and 5-item Social Justice Scale. 
Lastly, participants completed a short demographic survey [see Appendix E for complete 
survey].  
B. Results of Study 1 
A preliminary scan of the data revealed that most of the outcome variables were 
normally distributed with no outliers that were greatly affecting the mean. However, one 
variable, mean moral acceptability ratings of just but unfair scenarios at Time 1, 
displayed a negatively skewed distribution (skewness = -1.61, SE = .18; Shapiro-Wilke = 
.85, p < .001). When a square root transformation was applied to induce a normal 
distribution, neither the skewness nor the results of the analyses changed and, therefore, 
the transformation was not maintained.  
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i. Individual Differences  
In terms of self-reported values and beliefs, participants indicated high agreement 
with the 7-point Fairness scale (M = 5.61, SD = .97) and high agreement with the 7-point 
Social Justice scale, although with greater variability in scores (M = 5.22, SD = 1.40). 
Overall, however, Fairness and Social Justice scores as individual differences were not 
correlated with each other, r(357) = -.071, p > .1, and did not differ by condition 
(Fairness F(5,351) = 1.45, p = .21; Social Justice F(2,176) = 1.27, p = .28) 
Fairness scores were moderately positively correlated with mean moral 
acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1, r(179) = .286, p < .001, and 
at Time 2, r(179) = .283, p <.001. Social Justice scores were negatively correlated with 
mean moral acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1, r(179) = -.254, p 
< .001, at Time 2, r(179) = -.536, p < .001, and with the difference between time points, 
r(179) = -.489, p < .001 (see Table 1).  
Fairness scores were moderately negatively correlated with mean moral 
acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios at Time 2, r(178) = -.383, p < .001, and 
with the difference in scores between Time 1 and Time 2, r(178) = -.360, p <.001. Social 
Justice scores were positively correlated with mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but 
Unfair scenarios at Time 1, r(178) = .563, p < .001, and at Time 2, r(178) = .464, p < .001 
(see Table 2).  
These correlations provided the basis for exploration of individual difference 
measures of Fairness and Social Justice in accounting for the differences in mean moral 
acceptability ratings between time points and conditions.  
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ii. Hierarchical Linear Model  
A hierarchical linear model was used to analyze a data structure where time points 
(level-1) were nested within participants (level-2) randomly assigned to conditions. The 
dependent variable was participants’ mean moral acceptability ratings of eight scenarios 
(either Fair but Unjust or Just but Unfair). Model testing involved five steps that 
successively added more predictors, all with intercepts- and slopes-as-outcomes as 
variance existed at both levels; error variance from the individual scenarios was fixed 
using 1 – reliability (Cronbach’s α) multiplied by the variance of the set of scenarios at 
each time points. The final model included time, condition, Fairness scale score, Social 
Justice scale score, and their interactions as factors predicting mean moral acceptability 
ratings of scenarios. Scenario type, however, was randomly assigned and because there is 
no shared variance between participants assigned to either Fair but Unjust or Just but 
Unfair scenarios, this particular design does not allow for hierarchical linear modeling 
analysis comparing responses to one set of scenarios vs. the other.  
For Fair but Unjust scenarios, the regression coefficient representing the main 
effect of time was significant and negative (b = -1.30, p < .001) indicating that mean 
moral acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios decreased significantly across 
conditions from Time 1 to Time 2 (Time 1 M = 5.52, SD = .81; Time 2 M = 4.17, SD = 
1.32, see Figure 1). Second, there was a significant main effect of condition such that the 
Social Justice prime condition reduced Time 1 ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios as 
compared to the Control condition (b = -.43, p = .001), but this effect was not maintained 
at Time 2 (b = -.00, p = .964). The main effect of the Fair prime condition was marginal 
at Time 1 (b = -.26, p = .053), and non-significant at Time 2 (b = -.09, p = .560) as 
compared to the Control condition (see Figure 2). Third, individual differences as 
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measured by the Fairness and Social Justice scales proved influential at different time 
points, indicating a scale by time interaction. The regression coefficient representing the 
effect of an individual preference for Fairness was positive and significant at Time 1 (b = 
.20, p = .021, see Figure 3), and positive and significant at Time 2 (b = .27, p = .013, see 
Figure 4) suggesting that higher scores on the Fairness scale predicted higher mean moral 
acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios at both time points. The regression 
coefficient representing the effect of an individual preference for Social Justice was 
negative and significant only at Time 2 (b = -.35, p < .001, see Figure 5) suggesting that 
higher scores on the Social Justice scale predicted lower mean moral acceptability ratings 
only when the injustice was made apparent. Last, there was one significant three-way 
interaction whereby the regression coefficient representing the slope or decrease in 
ratings from Time 1 to Time 2 was further reduced for participants with higher individual 
preferences for Fairness who were assigned to the Social Justice prime (b = -.42, p = 
.009, see Figure 6). To ascertain whether this interaction was being driven by high or low 
scores on the Fairness scale, two separate models were run with one model using the 
Fairness scales centered one standard deviation below the mean and the other centered 
one standard deviation above the mean. The effect of the Social Justice prime condition 
was only significant at Time 2 when the model was centered to reflect high (b = .41, p = 
.043) but not low (b = -.42, p = .093) values on the Fairness scale indicating an 
acceptance of the Social Justice prime when responding to social injustice, especially for 
those high on Fairness. See Table 3 for regression coefficients.  
For Just but Unfair scenarios, the regression coefficient representing the main 
effect of time was significant and negative (b = -2.08, p < .001) indicating that mean 
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moral acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios decreased significantly across 
conditions from Time 1 to Time 2 (Time 1 M = 5.93, SD = 1.06; Time 2 M = 3.72, SD = 
1.32, see Figure 7). Second, the main effect of condition is not significant (see Figure 8). 
Third, an individual difference as measured by the Social Justice scale proved influential 
at different time points, indicating a scale by time interaction. The regression coefficient 
representing the effect of an individual preference for Social Justice was positive and 
significant at Time 1 (b = .51, p < .001) suggesting that higher scores on the Social 
Justice scale predicted higher mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair 
scenarios before the unfairness was made apparent (see Figure  9). Last, there was the 
same significant three-way interaction between scale, time, and condition whereby the 
decrease in ratings from Time 1 to Time 2 was further reduced for participants with 
higher individual preferences for Fairness who were assigned to the Social Justice prime 
(b = -.63, p = .015, see Figure 10). Again to ascertain whether this interaction was being 
driven by high or low scores on the Fairness scale, two separate models were run with 
one model using the Fairness scales centered one standard deviation below the mean and 
the other centered one standard deviation above the mean. The effect of the Social Justice 
prime condition was only significant at Time 2 when the model was centered to reflect 
high (b = -.76, p = .028) but not low (b = .45, p = .132) values on the Fairness scale 
indicating a negative reactance to the Social Justice prime when responding to unfairness, 
especially for those high on Fairness. See Table 4 for regression coefficients. 
C. Discussion of Study 1 
First, the hypothesized effect of time on mean moral acceptability ratings was 
borne out for both sets of scenarios such that illumination of the conflict between the two 
values represented in each scenario at Time 2 resulted in lower moral acceptability across 
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conditions as compared to Time 1.  The effect size for this was found to exceed 
convention for a medium effect (η2 = .5), η2 = .63 for Fair but Unjust scenarios, and η2 = 
.75 for Just but Unfair scenarios. Essentially, the negative consequences of upholding one 
(but violating the other) moral value between fairness and social justice were evaluated as 
less morally acceptable, regardless of primed conditions and individual differences in 
endorsement of fairness and social justice.  
Second, while the Fairness priming task had little to no effect on evaluations of 
scenarios, the Social Justice prime did have an effect but came into play at difference 
time points for each set of scenarios. Why might the scenario ratings in the Fairness 
prime condition and control condition look largely similar? One hypothesis that requires 
experimental confirmation is that fairness is a cognitive default perspective and using a 
social justice lens requires additional cognition. For Fair but Unjust scenarios, across time 
points, participants who were primed with social justice (the conflicting value), however, 
evaluated Fair but Unjust scenarios as less acceptable, compared to participants who were 
not primed with any value or with the consistent value of fairness. This finding supports 
the second hypothesis that priming participants with social justice principles can increase 
their sensitivity to violations of social justice in the fair but unjust scenarios before the 
conflict was made apparent at Time 2. For Just but Unfair scenarios, however, priming 
fairness principles did not have an effect on moral acceptability ratings of scenarios, so 
the condition by time interaction was not borne out for these scenarios. This may in part 
be due to the strong effects of individual preferences for each principle.  
Specifically, individual differences played a role in evaluations of both sets of 
scenarios as participants who were high on one scale evaluated value-consistent scenarios 
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as more morally acceptable at Time 1; the higher the participants were on the Fairness 
scale, the more morally acceptable they rated Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1 and the 
higher the participants were on the Social Justice scale, the more morally acceptable they 
rated Just but Unfair scenarios at Time 1. This is counter to the characteristics of the scale 
by time interaction predicted earlier; sensitivity to a principle did not encourage 
sensitivity to its violation, rather it only encouraged further endorsement of the scenarios 
that upheld it. Moreover, at Time 2 when the conflict was made apparent, evaluation of 
the Fair but Unjust scenarios was still consistent with individual differences in preference 
for Fairness. Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 2 were rated as increasingly morally 
acceptable as participants’ endorsement of Fairness increased and separately rated as less 
morally acceptable as participants’ endorsement of Social Justice decreased. Essentially, 
while the priming task was somewhat effective, it was not as effective as individual 
differences in endorsement of one or the other value at driving judgments of moral 
acceptability of the conflict between two values in a given scenario. 
At Time 2, the condition by time by scale interaction is significant for both types 
of scenarios, but the interpretation differs. For Fair but Unjust scenarios, participants high 
on fairness who were assigned to the Social Justice prime condition rated the violation of 
social justice as uniformly unacceptable, while participants primed with Fairness or in the 
control condition reported greater acceptability of the violation of social justice while 
upholding fairness as their individual preference for fairness increased. This suggests an 
acceptance of the Social Justice prime once the violation of social justice was made 
apparent, specifically for participants with high Fairness scores. For Just but Unfair 
scenarios, however, participants primed with the Social Justice prime rated the violation 
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of fairness at Time 2 as less acceptable as their preference for Fairness increased – and 
this relationship was stronger than for participants primed with Fairness or in the control 
condition.  The latter finding seems to reflect a reactance effect—that is, participants 
seemed to react against the Social Justice prime. This difference in interpretation of the 
same three-way interaction suggests that the two sets of scenarios, Fair but Unjust and 
Just but Unfair, may be qualitatively different; although the current study design does not 
allow for analyses that compare responses to both sets of scenarios to confirm this.  
At Time 1, however, participants’ endorsement of the conflicting value was still 
not predictive of their scenario ratings. That is, participants who were higher on Social 
Justice did not rate the Fair but Unjust scenarios any differently and participants higher 
on Fairness did not rate the Just but Unfair scenarios any differently. Essentially, the 
majority of participants did not recognize the negative consequences of upholding 
fairness and violating social justice, or vice versa, at Time 1. They were, however, largely 
averse to them when they were made apparent at Time 2. Therefore, if not a priming of 
the actual principles, an exploration of what will motivate this recognition is warranted.   
Ultimately, differing reactions to Fair but Unjust and Just but Unfair scenarios at 
Time 1 and Time 2 depending on individual differences and prime condition lend 
credence to conceptualizing fairness and social justice as separate moral values that are 
considered differently in different contexts, but similarly weighted nonetheless.  
However, a greater understanding of the different scenario-based responses to the social 
justice prime for those high on fairness requires further investigation.   
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 2 
A. Methods of Study 2 
 The second study attempted to understand whether focus on a unique individual 
identity or a collective identity involving common group membership would influence 
endorsement of fairness or social justice.   
i. Materials 
The independent variable was a priming task wherein participants responded to a 
writing prompt that was designed to focus thoughts on the individual vs. a collective 
identity, or neither (i.e., control condition). In the individual condition, participants wrote 
about the qualities that make them unique as individuals, while the group condition 
instructed participants to write about things they have in common with close others. More 
specifically, the priming task was a version of the Similarities and Differences from 
Families and Friends (SDFF) task adapted from Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto (1991). 
The manipulation has been previously found to be successful at priming individualism 
and collectivism (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Instructions to the participants read, "In the 
space provided, write several sentences about what you have in common with all of your 
friends and family” (collective) or “In the space provided, write several sentences about 
what makes you unique from your friends and family” (individual).  The latter establishes 
a unique personal identity by emphasizing how the participant is distinct from close 
others, whereas the former instruction emphasizes group-based commonalities and thus 
shared group membership. The control condition did not involve a priming task. The 
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dependent variable was moral acceptability ratings of the same scenarios used in Study 1 
[see Appendix A].  
ii. Hypotheses 
Condition as indicated by the priming task was a between-subjects variable and 
time was a within-subjects variable.  Therefore, we first hypothesized a main effect of 
time such that mean moral acceptability ratings of scenarios across conditions would 
decrease from Time 1 when the conflict was presented at Time 2 just as in Study 1.  
Second, we hypothesized an interaction of condition by time within type of 
scenario. Essentially, we predicted that participants focused on the collective group 
would rate scenarios where fairness was upheld but social justice was violated (Fair but 
Unjust) as less acceptable as compared to individuals primed with the individual or in the 
control condition for those scenarios. Similarly, we predicted that participants primed 
with focusing on the individual would rate scenarios where social justice was upheld but 
fairness was violated (Just but Unfair) as less acceptable compared to individuals primed 
with the collective or in the control condition for those scenarios. However, the 
interaction with time was predicted such that the difference in mean moral acceptability 
ratings within scenario type between conditions would be significant at Time 1 before the 
conflict was made apparent, but ratings at Time 2 would not differ between conditions; 
rather they would be equally low across conditions.  
Furthermore, in addition to these main analyses, moderation by individual 
differences in endorsement of Fairness and Social Justice was explored. Participants’ 
Fairness and Social Justice scores from the scales they completed at the end of the 
procedure may serve again as possible explanations for why certain subjects may already 
have been sensitive to each value above and beyond the prime. Specifically, we 
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hypothesized a scale by time interaction (hypothesis 3) such that participants high on 
Fairness would react negatively to Socially Just but Unfair scenarios, presumably initially 
recognizing the unfairness as they are sensitive to it, and rate them as less acceptable at 
Time 1, but at Time 2 they would rate them as low as people low on Fairness. Similarly, 
we predicted that participants high on Social Justice would react negatively to Fair but 
Socially Unjust scenarios, presumably recognizing the injustice, and rate them as less 
acceptable at Time 1 compared to people low on Social Justice. Moreover, we 
hypothesized a scale by time by condition three-way interaction (hypothesis 4) such that 
where scales and conditions are consonant (e.g. individual prime and high endorsement 
of Fairness or group prime and high endorsement of Social Justice) mean moral 
acceptability ratings of scenarios that uphold the same consonant value would be 
increased mean at Time 1, as the prime may particularly activate sensitivity to the 
consonant principle.  
iii. Participants  
Participants were recruited online from a diverse and inclusive population. A total 
of 326 participants were assigned to one of six conditions. Although 461 participants 
originally completed the study, participants were excluded if they refused to give consent 
or did not complete the priming task, incorrectly answered the attention check question 
(marked a different option for a question instructing participants to mark “Option 4”), 
took 1 standard deviation less than the mean time to complete the study, or took two 
standard deviations more than the mean time to complete the study.  There were only two 
outliers on the political identity scale who indicated a conservative political identity but 
also a contradictory strong belief in social justice; a closer look showed that these 
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respondents had entered the same number as a response for all questions and were thus 
removed from the sample for not completing the study conscientiously. Informed consent 
was obtained for all of the included participants and they received monetary 
compensation for their participation.  
Participants ranged from age 18 to age 74 (M = 35.70, SD = 11.43). Fifty-seven 
percent of the participants were female, and 43% were male. The sample was 76.4% 
White, 5.5% Black, 7.1% Hispanic, 5.5% Asian, and 5.5% reported ‘Other’.  
iv. Procedure 
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of six conditions (3 x 2) where 
priming task (individual, collective, or control) was crossed with which value was upheld 
in the Time 1 scenarios (fairness but not social justice, or social justice but not fairness). 
Again, participants were not given a mixed set of all 16 scenarios due to contamination of 
concepts – participants would be sensitive to both values upheld equally in the combined 
set of scenarios. Each participant first responded to one of the two writing prompts or did 
not complete a prime (control condition). Then, participants read the 8 assigned scenarios 
and rated their moral acceptability given the Time 1 information (Fair but Unjust 
Scenarios at Time 1 Cronbach’s α = .745; Just but Unfair scenarios at Time 1 α = .853).  
They then read the scenarios with the Time 2 information provided and once again rated 
their moral acceptability (Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 2 α = .907; Just but Unfair 
scenarios at Time 2 α = .904). Participants then completed the Fairness and Social Justice 
Scales. Lastly, participants completed a short demographic survey [see Appendix E for 
complete survey].  
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B. Results of Study 2 
A preliminary scan of the data revealed that all of the outcome variables were 
normally distributed and most had no outliers that were greatly affecting the mean.  
i. Individual Differences  
In terms of self-reported values and beliefs, participants indicated high agreement 
with the 7-point Fairness scale (M = 5.59, SD = .98) and high agreement with the 7-point 
Social Justice scale, although with greater variability in scores (M = 5.20, SD = 1.49). 
Overall, Fairness and Social Justice scores were also negatively correlated with each 
other, r(326) = -.172, p < .05, but did not differ by condition, Fairness F(5,320,  = .94), p 
= .46 and Social Justice F(5, 320) = .91, p = .48.  
Fairness scores were moderately positively correlated with mean moral 
acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1, r(167) = .282, p < .001, and 
at Time 2, r(167) = .179, p <.05, but not with the difference between Time 1 and Time 2 
(r(167) = .110, p > .5). Social Justice scores were negatively correlated with mean moral 
acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1, r(167) = -.281, p < .001, at 
Time 2, r(167) = -.660, p < .001, and with the difference between time points, r(167) = -
.602, p < .001 (see Table 5).  
Fairness scores were moderately negatively correlated with mean moral 
acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios at Time 2, r(159) = -.261, p = .001, and 
with the difference in scores between Time 1 and Time 2, r(159) = -.272, p =.001. Social 
Justice scores were positively correlated with mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but 
Unfair scenarios at Time 1, r(159) = .630, p < .001, and at Time 2, r(159) = .538, p < 
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.001, but not with the difference between Time 1 and Time 2, r(159) = .091, p > .1 (see 
Table 6).  
These correlations again provided the basis for exploring Fairness and Social 
Justice scores in accounting for differences in mean moral acceptability ratings of 
scenarios.  
ii. Hierarchical Linear Model 
A hierarchical linear model was used to analyze a data structure where time points 
(level-1) were nested within participants (level-2) randomly assigned to conditions. The 
dependent variable was participants’ mean moral acceptability ratings of eight scenarios 
(either Fair but Unjust or Just but Unfair). Model testing involved five steps that 
successively added more predictors, all with intercepts- and slopes-as-outcomes as 
variance existed at both levels; error variance from the individual scenarios was fixed 
using 1 – reliability (Cronbach’s α) multiplied by the variance of the set of scenarios at 
each time points. The final model included time, condition, Fairness scale score, Social 
Justice scale score, and their interactions as factors predicting mean moral acceptability 
ratings of scenarios. Scenario type, however, was randomly assigned and because there is 
no shared variance between participants assigned to either Fair but Unjust or Just but 
Unfair scenarios, this particular design does not allow for hierarchical linear modeling 
analysis comparing responses to one set of scenarios vs. the other.  
For Fair but Unjust scenarios, the regression coefficient representing the main 
effect of time was significant and negative as hypothesized (b = -1.96, p < .001, see 
Figure 11) indicating that mean moral acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios 
decreased significantly across conditions from Time 1 to Time 2 (Time 1 M = 5.54, SD = 
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.90; Time 2 M = 3.85, SD = 1.49). Second, there were no significant main effects of 
condition (see Figure 12), counter to the second hypothesis. Third, individual differences 
as measured by the Fairness and Social Justice scales proved influential at different time 
points, indicating a scale by time interaction. The regression coefficient representing the 
effect of an individual preference for Fairness was positive and significant at Time 1 (b = 
.30, p = .012,see Figure 13) suggesting that higher scores on the Fairness scale predicted 
higher mean moral acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios only at Time 1. The 
regression coefficient representing the effect of an individual preference for Social 
Justice was negative and significant only at Time 2 (b = -.65, p < .001, see Figure 14) 
suggesting that higher scores on the Social Justice scale predicted lower mean moral 
acceptability ratings only when the injustice was made apparent. Last, the hypothesized 
scale by time by condition interaction was not supported. See Table 7 for regression 
coefficients. 
For Just but Unfair scenarios, the regression coefficient representing the main 
effect of time was significant and negative as hypothesized (b = -2.04, p < .001, see 
Figure 15) indicating that mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios 
decreased significantly across conditions from Time 1 to Time 2 (Time 1 M = 5.82, SD = 
1.01; Time 2 M = 3.85, SD = 1.42, see Figure 16). Second, an individual difference as 
measured by the Social Justice scale proved influential at different time points, indicating 
a scale by time interaction. The regression coefficient representing the effect of an 
individual preference for social justice was positive and significant at Time 1 (b = .24, p 
< .001,see Figure 17) suggesting that higher scores on the Social Justice scale predicted 
higher mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios before the unfairness 
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is made apparent. In addition, the regression coefficient representing the effect of an 
individual preference for fairness was negative and significant at Time 2 (b = -.36, p = 
.030, see Figure 18) suggesting that higher scores on the Fairness scale predicted lower 
mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios when the unfairness was 
made apparent. Last, there is a scale by time by condition interaction whereby 
participants with a high preference for social justice who were in both the group prime (b 
= .28, p = .004) and the individual prime (b = .35, p < .001) conditions rated the Just but 
Unfair scenarios at Time 1 as more acceptable than participants in the control condition 
(see Figure 19). See Table 8 for regression coefficients.  
C. Discussion of Study 2 
First, the hypothesized effect of time on mean moral acceptability ratings was 
again borne out for both sets of scenarios such that illumination of the conflict between 
the two values represented in each scenario at Time 2 resulted in lower moral 
acceptability across conditions as compared to Time 1.  The effect size for this was found 
to exceed convention for a medium effect (η2 = .5), η2 = .65 for Fair but Unjust scenarios, 
and η2 = .70 for Just but Unfair scenarios. Essentially, the negative consequences of 
upholding one (but violating the other) moral value between fairness and social justice 
were evaluated as less morally acceptable, regardless of primed conditions and individual 
differences in political ideology, identical to the results of Study 1.  
Second, there was no effect of prime condition on the mean moral acceptability 
ratings of scenarios at either of the two time points. Third, however, individual 
differences in endorsement of fairness and social justice again accounted for a significant 
amount of variance in the mean moral acceptability ratings of scenarios in a scale by time 
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interaction. The higher the participants were on the Fairness scale, the more morally 
acceptable they rated Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1, and the higher the participants 
were on the Social Justice scale, the more morally acceptable they rated Just but Unfair 
scenarios at Time 1. Moreover, at Time 2 when the conflict was made apparent, 
evaluation of the scenarios was again consistent with individual differences, as Fair but 
Unjust scenarios at Time 2 (when the injustice was made apparent) were rated as less 
morally acceptable as participants’ endorsement of social justice increased, and Just but 
Unfair scenarios at Time 2 (when the unfairness was made apparent) were rated as less 
morally acceptable as participants’ endorsement of fairness increased.  
 The individual difference in endorsement of social justice also affected 
acceptability ratings of the scenarios when interacting with both priming tasks.  The 
significant interaction effect between scores on the Social Justice scale and both prime 
conditions on Just but Unfair scenarios at Time 1 may be the result of a failure of the 
priming task chosen; writing about how one is either different from or similar to close 
friends and family are both exercises in thinking about others and relationships, which 
may broadly have emphasized participants’ endorsement of social justice rather than 
fairness. Why might the individual and collective primes not have been effective in their 
own right? Although the Similarities and Differences from Family and Friends task 
(Trafimow, et al., 1991) has proven successful at priming an individual or collective 
identity, it may be that fairness and social justice have more to do with an individual or 
group/social category identity than an ambiguous collective identity. Perhaps if a 
group/social category identity is made salient over an individual identity, social justice 
would become more relevant and vice versa.  
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However, once again, the majority of participants did not recognize the negative 
consequences of upholding fairness and violating social justice, or vice versa, at Time 1, 
but were largely averse to them when they were made apparent at Time 2. Although an 
individual identity prime and a collective identity prime did not strongly and uniformly 
affect participants’ ratings of scenarios representing conflicting values, participants’ 
individual endorsement of each value separately did affect these ratings. Study 2, then, 
provides further support for conceptualizing fairness and social justice as separate 
influential moral values.  
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CHAPTER 6  
DISCUSSION  
A. General Discussion 
Studies 1 and 2 both provide evidence to bolster the conceptualization of social 
justice as a moral value that is separate from, but comparable to, fairness. In Study 1, 
priming principles of social justice sensitized participants to social justice concerns 
implicit in descriptions of Fair but Unjust scenarios before they were made explicit. 
However, rather than priming task, participants’ individual endorsement of fairness and 
social justice was most predictive of evaluations of both scenarios. High endorsement of 
fairness predicted increased moral acceptability of fair but unjust scenarios, both when 
they were first presented and even when the negative consequences to groups in society 
(social justice) were made apparent. High endorsement of social justice predicted 
increased moral acceptability of just but unfair scenarios at Time 1. The only objections 
to the scenarios in terms of individual differences came at Time 2, when the 
consequences were made apparent, and higher endorsement of the conflicting principle 
predicted decreased ratings of the scenarios. Importantly, social justice and fairness were 
not correlated, nor did they differ by condition, supporting the idea that the two are stable 
and orthogonal individual differences that are differentially made salient by context (i.e. 
scenario).  
In Study 2, priming an “individual” or a “collective” identity did not consistently 
influence moral acceptability ratings of conflicting scenarios. Nevertheless, the 
ineffectiveness of the “collective” prime may help clarify the concept of social justice as 
a distribution rule that requires the acknowledgement of social categories and not simply 
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collections of people in a group. In fact, across scenarios and conditions, participants’ 
endorsement of fairness and social justice were most predictive of evaluations of 
scenarios: as participants’ endorsement of social justice increased, scenarios were rated as 
less morally acceptable if they upheld fairness and violated social justice and rated as 
more morally acceptable if they upheld social justice and violated fairness – and vice 
versa for participants high on fairness.  
Although we had hypothesized condition by time and scale by time interactions 
similar to the results in both studies, the time point that elicited a reaction was not Time 
1, but Time 2 – when the violations of each principle were made apparent. Essentially, 
across both studies, although individual preferences for fairness and social justice as 
values increased the moral acceptability of value-consistent scenarios, participants did 
not seem to recognize the value conflicts inherent in the scenarios until the (conflicting) 
consequences were made explicit, at which point acceptability significantly decreased. 
Interestingly, participants displayed a slight inoculation to even these negative 
consequences if their strong individual preference for fairness or social justice continued 
to be upheld in the scenario.  
Nevertheless, our first hypothesized main effect of time was borne out across 
scenarios and conditions such that moral acceptability decreased significantly when the 
violation of the opposing principle was made apparent. The consistent drop in moral 
acceptability of the scenarios from Time 1 to Time 2 may involve the observation that at 
Time 2, some harm  introduced into a scenario that, at Time 1, involved no harm. 
However, the harm that is explicit at Time 2 is nevertheless implicit at Time 1 and visible 
to participants who may be motivated to recognize it, although this may involve too much 
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effortful processing. Furthermore, priming principles of social justice did decrease moral 
acceptability of fair but unjust scenarios at Time 1 in study 1, suggesting that at least 
some participants were sensitized to the implicit harm through this manipulation.  
Overall, there was still little recognition of the negative consequences of upholding 
one moral value and violating the other until the violation was made explicit. Some 
factors, however, made this recognition more likely. Specifically, strong individual 
preferences for one or the other value, priming social justice principles, and priming a 
group identity all had varying effects on moral acceptability ratings of scenarios, but all 
participants demonstrated the belief that in scenarios where fairness and social justice 
conflict, the consequences of violating one and upholding the other are markedly less 
morally acceptable.  
B. Limitations & Future Directions 
Three methodological changes might be considered to improve upon the 
limitations of the described studies. First, Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1 had the 
lowest internal reliability of all of the sets of scenarios. Perhaps generating more 
scenarios and expanding the variety of contexts might give more insight into how the 
scenarios differ in quality. In addition to expanding the scenarios, both study designs 
were limited in their inability to compare across sets of scenarios (that is, between Fair 
but Unjust and Just but Unfair scenarios), which may have yielded more information 
about how the two types of dilemmas are qualitatively different from each other. Second, 
Study 2 attempted to prime a “collective” identity that may not be as relevant to social 
justice and fairness as a “group” identity in the form of social categories. Making these 
salient or not in a revised study might be more effective at encouraging participants to 
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use a social justice or fairness lens. Third, both studies made use of a sample recruited 
online through Amazon Mechanical Turk; although participants reported variance in 
demographics, some responses may be unique to this sample, such as socioeconomic 
status as revealed by access to a computer.  
Also, in both studies, social justice demonstrated an effect either as an individual 
difference or as a prime as compared to the control conditions – but not fairness. Might 
this lack of difference suggest that fairness is the normal “default” lens and using a social 
justice lens requires different or motivated cognition? A test might, for example, involve 
participants who express a high preference for social justice who then evaluate similar 
conflicting scenarios either under cognitive load or with time and capacity to consider 
their reasoning. A decreased preference for social justice when under cognitive load 
might lend support to the idea of a fairness perspective being the “default” lens with 
which we morally evaluate the allocation of resources. 
Last, a consistent main effect of time in both studies demonstrates that 
participants were largely approving of scenarios in which negative consequences based 
on the violation of fairness or social justice were implicit – until these consequences were 
made apparent at Time 2 and moral acceptability ratings decreased significantly. 
Although some individual differences increased moral acceptability at Time 1, no 
individual differences consistently decreased moral acceptability at Time 1. Besides 
overtly displaying principles of social justice, what factors will encourage sensitivity to 
the negative consequences of upholding one moral value while violating the other 
without overt explanation? Is it that such recognition is too effortful? Must we be 
motivated by some internal force or external direction to recognize them in spite of 
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requiring this effort? Or is the simple lack of information about the possible 
consequences to individuals or groups in society the major barrier to recognition? Further 
study is warranted.  
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Table 1: Correlations between FUJ outcomes and individual differences 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlations between JUF outcomes and individual difference 
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Table 3: Final Estimation of HLM Fixed Effects Fair but Unjust Scenarios Study 1 
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Table 4: Final Estimation of HLM Fixed Effects Just but Unfair Scenarios Study 1 
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Table 5: Correlations between FUJ outcomes and individual differences (Study 2) 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Correlations between JUF outcomes and individual difference (Study 2)
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Table 7: Final Estimation of HLM Fixed Effects Fair but Unjust Scenarios Study 2 
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Table 8: Final Estimation of HLM Fixed Effects Just but Unfair Scenarios Study 2 
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Figure 1: Main effect of time FUJ scenarios Study 1 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Main effect of condition FUJ scenarios Study 1 
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Figure 3: Main effect of Fairness Scale on Time 1 FUJ Scenarios Study 1 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Main effect of Fairness Scale on Time 2 FUJ Scenarios Study 1 
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Figure 5: Main effect of Social Justice Scale on Time 2 FUJ Scenarios Study 1
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Interaction of Social Justice Prime by Fairness Scale FUJ Scenarios Study 1 
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Figure 7: Main effect of time JUF scenarios Study 1
  
 
Figure 8: Main effect of condition JUF scenarios Study 1
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Figure 9: Main effect of Social Justice scale on Time1 JUF scenarios Study 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Interaction of Social Justice Prime by Fairness Scale JUF Scenarios Study 1 
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Figure 11: Main effect of time FUJ scenarios Study 2
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Main effect of condition FUJ scenarios Study 2 
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Figure 13: Main effect of Fairness scale on Time 1 FUJ scenarios Study 2 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Main effect of Social Justice scale on Time 2 FUJ scenarios Study 2
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Figure 15: Main effect of time JUF scenarios Study 2
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Main effect of condition JUF scenarios Study 2
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Figure 17: Main effect of Social Justice scale on Time 1 JUF scenarios Study 2
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Interaction of Prime Conditions & Social Justice scale JUF scenarios Study 2
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Figure 19: Main effect of Fairness scale on Time 2 JUF scenarios Study 2  
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APPENDIX A 
SCENARIOS 
 
1) Time 1: In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal of money to their 
children’s public school.  
Time 2: In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal of money to their 
children’s public school. Other public schools in the city with lower income 
families get no additional funds from parents. 
 
2) Time 1: The U.S. has a volunteer army, and individuals are free to enlist. 
Time 2: The U.S. has a volunteer army, and individuals are free to enlist. 
Volunteers in the U.S. army overwhelmingly come from low income families and 
have few job opportunities. 
 
3) Time 1: Students at a respected college are admitted solely on the basis of their 
academic merit - a combination of students’ grade point average and their SAT 
scores.  
Time 2: Students at a respected college are admitted solely on the basis of their 
academic merit - a combination of students’ grade point average and their SAT 
scores. Students who were not afforded the opportunity to have a high-quality 
education are very unlikely to be admitted. 
 
4) Time 1: A popular company provides experience to students through valuable, 
unpaid summer internships.  
Time 2: A popular company provides experience to students through valuable, 
unpaid summer internships. Students who must earn money over the summer are 
not at liberty to accept unpaid internships.  
 
5) Time 1: A public school encourages students to join others in field learning 
outside of the classroom for a travel fee. 
Time 2: A public school encourages students to join others in field learning 
outside of the classroom for a small travel fee. Students from low-income families 
are not able to pay the fee and, thus, are left behind. 
 
6) Time 1: A university offers admission into an exclusive honors program, with 
smaller classes and greater networking opportunities, which results in increased 
tuition levels.  
Time 2: A university offers admission into an exclusive honors program, with 
smaller classes and greater networking opportunities, which results in increased 
tuition levels. Students from low-income families are not able to take advantage 
of these opportunities, regardless of how quailed they may be.  
 
7) Time 1: A state requires all voters to show government-issued identification 
before casting their vote at state elections 
Time 2: A state requires all voters to show government-issued identification 
before casting their vote at state elections. Poorer residents of the state cannot 
afford the identification fee or the travel to procure one.   
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8) Time 1: On some crowded highways in the U.S., people can pay to be allowed to 
drive on a reserved lane that has less traffic. 
Time 2: On some crowded highways in the U.S., people can pay to be allowed to 
drive on a reserved lane that has less traffic. People who cannot afford the extra 
toll do not have access to the faster lanes.  
 
Scenarios: Just but Unfair 
 
1) Time 1: A very successful state-funded program has been established for special 
needs children who are also from underserved communities.  
Time 2: A very successful state-funded program has been established for special 
needs children who are also from underserved communities. Some parents with 
special needs children want to send their children to the successful program, but 
cannot because they are not from an under-served community. 
 
2) Time 1: Top colleges are engaging in major recruitment efforts at low income 
high schools to increase interest and applications from these students. 
Time 2: Top colleges are engaging in major recruitment efforts at low income 
high schools to increase interest and applications from these students. Students at 
private high schools are now receiving less attention from top colleges. 
 
3) Time 1: Students at a major university are admitted based on a combination of 
factors, including, in particular, past hardship, and group membership.  
Time 2: Students at a major university are admitted based on a combination of 
factors, including, in particular, past hardship, and group membership. Some 
students with better academic records are not admitted to the university. 
 
4) Time 1: Several major universities provide need-based financial aid for students 
from families living below the poverty line.  
Time 2: Several major universities provide need-based financial aid for students 
from families living below the poverty line. Students from families living even 
slightly above the poverty line still cannot afford tuition and are not offered the 
same aid.  
 
5) Time 1: In a new urban housing development, rent does not increase for its low-
income tenants when the market for real estate changes. 
Time 2: In a new urban housing development, rent does not increase for its low-
income tenants when the market for real estate changes. The rest of the city’s 
tenants must pay increased rent as market prices for real estate increase.   
 
6) Time 1: Currently in the US, health care is provided to everyone and the 
government pays for those who cannot afford it.  
Time 2: Currently in the US, health care is provided to everyone and the 
government pays for those who cannot afford it. The funds for this program come 
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from tax payers’ contributions and healthcare is provided even to those who do 
not take good care of their health.  
 
7) Time 1: A highly valued job training program is offered to people from typically 
underserved areas of the city.  
Time 2: A highly valued job training program is offered to people from typically 
underserved areas of the city. People who may benefit from the program, but do 
not reside in those underserved areas, are not able to participate.  
 
8) Time 1: A major company in an urban area works hard to hire employees that 
reflect the makeup of the city’s population.  
Time 2: A major company in an urban area works hard to hire employees that 
reflect the makeup of the city’s population. There are therefore highly qualified 
applicants to the company who are not selected.  
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APPENDIX B 
SCRAMBLE PRIMES 
 
Scrambled Sentences: Social Justice (Study 1) 
 
The healthier the society, the greater [equality economic the]. 
 
A decent society tries to [the minimize income] between those at the very top and the 
very bottom. 
 
In the end, large inequalities are [society to harmful]. 
 
Wealthy nations have a special responsibility [to poverty eliminate].    
 
Scrambled Sentences: Filler Items (Study 1) 
 
National parks contain many of our [treasured most landscapes].  
 
Mount McKinley, the [highest in mountain] the US, has been renamed Denali.  
 
Scrambled Sentences: Fairness (Study 1) 
 
The [work harder people], the greater the outcome they should receive. 
 
If two people work on a project and [contributes one more] than the other, that person 
should receive a greater reward.  
 
Promotion decisions ought to take into account the [effort put workers] into their jobs. 
 
In organizations people who do their jobs well [ought rise to] to the top. 
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APPENDIX C 
FAIRNESS SCALE 
 
Fairness Scale (Revised Preference for Merit Principle Scale) 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each o the following 
statements by circling the appropriate number on the scale below.  Items are to be rated 
on a seven-point scale with the following anchors: (1) strongly disagree (2) moderately 
disagree (3) slightly disagree (4) neither agree nor disagree (5) slightly agree (6) 
moderately agree and (7) strongly agree. 
 
1. In society, people who do a good job ought to rise to the top. 
2. The effort a person puts into something ought to be reflected in the size of the reward 
he or she receives.  
3. Members of a team ought to receive different rewards depending on the amount each 
person contributed.  
4. Between two equally smart people, the one who is the harder worker ought to always 
be rewarded more.  
5. If every person in a group has the same abilities, rewards ought to be given to the 
person who puts in the most effort. 
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APPENDIX D 
SOCIAL JUSTICE SCALE 
 
Social Justice Scale 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each o the following 
statements by circling the appropriate number on the scale below.  Items are to be rated 
on a seven-point scale with the following anchors: (1) strongly disagree (2) moderately 
disagree (3) slightly disagree (4) neither agree nor disagree (5) slightly agree (6) 
moderately agree and (7) strongly agree. 
 
1. It is our responsibility, not just a matter of personal preference, to provide for 
groups worse off in society. 
2. It is important for those who are better off to help provide resources for the most 
vulnerable members of society. 
3. In the healthiest societies, those at the top should feel responsible for improving 
the well-being of those at the bottom. 
4. Increased economic equality is ultimately beneficial to everyone in society. 
5. Helping those at the bottom of society will not discourage them from working 
harder. 
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APPENDIX E 
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 
 
 
Religion 
1. To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?  
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = not at all religious, 7 = very religious) 
 
2. How important a role does religion play in your life? 
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = not at all important, 7 = very important) 
 
 
Politics 
1. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = strong democrat, 7 = strong republican) 
 
2. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative) 
 
Ethnicity 
White – Black – Hispanic/Latino/a – Asian/Pacific Islander –  
American Indian/Alaskan Native – Multiethnic – Other 
 
Age 
Open-ended response 
 
Gender 
Male – Female – Prefer not to disclose 
 
Father’s highest level of education 
Did not complete high school – High school degree/GED – Some college –  
Bachelor’s degree – Master’s degree – Advanced graduate work – Not sure 
 
Mother’s highest level of education 
Did not complete high school – High school degree/GED – Some college –  
Bachelor’s degree – Master’s degree – Advanced graduate work – Not sure 
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